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Introduction
In the wake of the fall of state economic control in Eastern Europe, free enterprise
activities have grown dramatically, accompanied in most cases by inoves toward multiparty
politics. Against this backdrop, a variety of pyramid investment schemes took root in several of
these countries. Among the largest and most important were those in Romania and Albania. This
paper is a preliminary comparison of schemes arising in these countries, which are among the
poorest and formerly most repressive in Eastern Europe. 1
Our analysis is designed to look at a range of economic; political and security issues
flowing from the triple transition underway in all the formerly one-party hegemonic countries of
communist Eastern Europe. First, we wish to consider what this detour on the road to the market
has meant for these economies. How do such activities interact with the "shock therapy"
prescribed by Western financial power brokers who hold the purse strings that control credits and
foreign investments. Secondly, what do the rise of these schemes imply in terms of standard
economic theory? We consider whether these represent the kind of irrational behavior that
Kindleberger (1989) argues fuels speculative bubbles. Thirdly, and with regard to Albania most
tentatively at this stage, what are the political-security consequences that result from government
policy towards these get-rich-quick schemes that played on the dreams and greed of needy
societies with little experience in evaluating emerging investment opportunities.
We first begin with Caritas, the largest and most successful of the Romanian schemes,
because the 1992-1993 time line of the rise and fall of Caritas means that political and economic
policy makers in Albania had an opportunity to observe this experience prior to the 1996
expansion of similar schemes in their country. Furthermore, interested outsiders--the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union and the U.S.--could use the
Romanian example in their attempts to impress upon the Tirana government the risks of such
schemes.
Among the variety of pyramid schemes which developed in Romania after the 1989
revolution, most failed after a few months, providing returns to their organizers and a few early
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.
investors. In contrast, Caritas survived for nearly 19 months in 1992 and 1993. The returns for
successful "investors" in the scheme were extraordinary, providing payments of eight times the
original investment in three to four months, equivalent to an annual interest rate of more than
100,000 percent. For those who invested during the first 15 months of the scheme, promised
payments were made out of an ever-increasing pool of new investments. At its peak, the flow of
investments may have amounted to more than 10 percent of the gross domestic product of
Romania. In all, Caritas may have involved more than 4 million investors who made total
payments of well over $500 million and possibly several times-that amount. When the scheme
failed in late 1993, a substantial share of Romanians suffered losses. Caritas may have been the
largest transparent pyramid scheme to ever exist.
As in Romania, in Albania the fall of communism and the demise of the centrally planned
economy led to the rise in 1991 of a number of pyramid schemes. In contrast to the experience
in Romania, a substantial number of Albanian get-rich-quick schemes remained in operation for
extended periods, involving a large proportion of the country's inhabitants, many of whom
appear to have invested their life savings in the schemes. More than in Romania, the schemes
were tied to the central government and to political parties. Consequently, the collapse of
pyramid schemes in early 1997 had a devastating impact on Albania, sparking widespread
violent unrest in many cities and plunging the country into its worst political and economic crisis
since the downfall of communism. The Albanian schemes were clearly unique in terms of their
impacts on the social and political structure of a national unit.
The growth and extent of such pyramid schemes are of interest both to students of
economic transition and to those interested in the application of modem economic theory. The
dominant paradigm used by economists assumes that markets reflect rational behavior and
mutually consistent expectations. As a result, pyramid schemes cannot exist. Since most of
those who invest in such schemes must ultimately be disappointed, investors' expectations taken
jointly are mutually inconsistent. -Just as economic markets will determine-prices for land,
stocks, or bonds based on underlying expected return, rational behavior will ensure that no one
participates in pyramid schemes.
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The survival of these schemes therefore provides a challenge to the applicability of the
dominant economic theory. In large part, this analysis will attempt to understand how schemes
of this kind ccmld survive so long and grow so large, identifying why the simple implications of
the economic theory are violated. Of course, the first question that might be asked is whether
theory which applies in developed economies may not apply in these countries. Following years
of direct government control of the economy, individuals may not have had sufficient experience
to form consistent economic expectations. In this case, the growth of pyramid schemes may
merely identify a learning phase for an economy's participants, expected to yield to a stable set of
expectations and ultimately to economic stability. Alternatively, there may be something unique
in the political or social climates that allowed the schemes to prosper. In this case, cultural or
political changes may be necessary before economic stability within a free enterprise framework
can obtain.
Kindleberger's (1989) view of the behavioral bases of speculative bubbles implies that a
more radical revision of economic theory may be necessary to understand such schemes.
Kindleberger argues that although stability prevails under most circumstances, occasionally
irrational and mutually inconsistent expectations seize a market and grow to dominate. He
suggests that financial crises are fueled by individual behaviors that are outside the predictions of
rational models. The success of pyramid schemes may support Kindleberger's claim and also
may provide some clue as to when such instability will prevail. While conventional economic
theory underscores the need for the government to enforce property rights, if Kindleberger's
interpretation is correct, it suggests a broader role for government.
In most of the former communist countries, standards of living and other indicators of
economic health have suffered severe declines since the fall of communism. Schemes such as
those in Romania and Albania draw resources from productive investments, ultimately enriching
the few winners at the cost of the many. More important, long term economic growth requires
the establishment of stable markets for investment. These schemes may reduce the confidence in
general investment markets, possibly reducing the willingness of individuals to support
productive enterprises.

3

.I
The Rise and Fall of Caritas2
The Rise. Caritas began operations in the Romanian city of Cluj on April 14, 1992. It
had previously operated in the city ofBrasov, about 200 miles from Cluj, where it had been
registered as a limited liability company. In the face of apparent difficulties, it was reestablished
in Cluj where the nationalist leader and city mayor Gheorghe Funar welcomed it. Caritas was
established by loan Stoica, who maintained sole control of operations throughout the life of the
scheme.
The scheme's rules were simple. An individual invested a sum of money ·and received a
receipt. The minimum initial investment was 20,000 lei ($20), and the maximum was 120,000
lei, although the latter limit was not in force in the later stages of the game. 3 Three to four
months later, the investor's name would be listed in the Mesagerul transilvan (Transylvania

Messenger), a Cluj newspaper, at which point he would be eligible to retrieve an amount eight
times the original investment. Payments were available in cash, but those claiming payments
were also given the option of reinvesting any winnings for additional cycles.
After the fall of Romania's communist government in 1989, a large number of similar
schemes had been established, but few of them had lasted more than a few months. In each case,
the final wave of investors had lost their money. In contrast, Caritas continued to grow through
1992 and most of 1993. It was originally located in offices rented to it by the municipal
government near the Cluj central city, but with growth, it moved to more spacious quarters .. Near
its peak in the summer of 1993, it was operating in a public sports complex. In addition to its
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We are aware of only a limited and dispersed literature dealing with Caritas. Of
accounts in English, Verdery (1996) provides the most detailed, while Shafir (1993) provides a
good summary with an emphasis on political matters. While coverage in the Romanian press has
been extensive, we know of no single comprehensive source. A two part sociological analysis
appeared in Mihu (1993b).
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Shafir ( 1993) and Verdery ( 1996) reported a maximum initi_al investment limit of
160,000 lei in late summer 1993. Many of the details involved in Caritas are not known with
certainty, since published reports are often inconsistent. This may reflect inconsistencies in
actual practices, changes in practices over the life of the game, or misinformation provided to
j oumalists.
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main office in Cluj, Caritas operated branches in Turda and Dej, towns within 40 miles of Cluj,
but investments made in these locations were small compared to those made at the main office.
While the investment limit of 120,000 lei may appear modest, it exceeded the average
monthly earnings in Romania in that period. In return for a payment equal to a single month's
salary, an investor could obtain the equivalent to five years' salary in just two cycles--seven
months--or a lifetime's earnings in just three cycles. Stories of investors purchasing expensive
consumer goods, automobiles and housing were common by the summer of 1993. The
newspaper in which winners' names were listed, grew dramatically from a circulation of several
thousand to several hundred thousand.

Size and Extent. The peak month, in terms of numbers of players investing, was probably
July of 1993. Simple calculations suggest that even with a very small start, the scheme would
have needed to attract a large number of new investors to survive 15 months. However, the
necessary size depends on the reinvestment rate .. During the life of the game, the reinvestment
rate was probably between 50 percent and 90 percent and probably closer to 90 percent. 4 With
the latter reinvestment rate, the scheme would need to attract new investors to pay only a tenth of
the winnings owed.
During early July of 1993, we counted the number of winners listed in the newspaper as
20,000 to 30,000 per day. Since the.scheme operated seven days.a week at that point, this.
implied a minimum of 600,000 winners during July, but allowing for growth during the month,
the number could easily be a million. Since all winners during this time received full payment, if
the size of each account and reinvestment rate were known, we could calculate the total amount
of money newly invested in the scheme during the month. A lower estimate can be obtained by
assuming that the number of investors receiving payments was 600,000, that they had invested
20,000 lei, and that they chose to reinvest 90 percent of the 160,000 lei that they were owed. In
4

Inference~ about Caritas investors.are based on media reports.and interviews we
conducted with more than 100 Caritas investors. Our interview sample is not random, since it is
largely based on personal contacts and is heavily weighted toward residents of Cluj. One
advantage of using personal contacts is that the information may be more accurate than that
obtained through survey methods, especially given the distrust that Romanians have of official
bureaucracy.
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this case, new money equal to 32,000 lei per person would need to be invested, or approximately
7.2 billion lei ($7 .2 million). On the other hand, if the total number of investors receiving
payment was 1 million, with prior cycle investments of 120,000 lei, and they were reinvesting
only 50 percent of their winnings, the total required to pay investors would have been 480 billion
lei ($480 million). Our best guess is the typical participant reinvested appreciably more than 50
percent of his winnings, and that the average prior investment was over 100,000 lei, so that the
total money raised in July was probably in the range of 200-250 billion lei.
This estimate is a little higher than the figures provided by Caritas ina November·1993
press conference. Caritas reported that, at its peak in July, it had raised 138 billion lei, provided
by the investments of 1.109 million new participants, suggesting an average investment of
124,000 lei per person. There are reasons to believe that such figures may underestimate actual
investments. When the government ultimately seized Caritas records in 1994, accounting
information was in disarray, with accounting tasks decentralized to the point of chaos. The
structure of computer programs and accounting methods would have allowed easy alteration of
records. 5
The importance of the scheme in the Romanian economy can be gauged by noting that
the 1993 gross domestic product for Romania was 19,737 billion lei (Economist Intelligence
Unit, 1994). Using 200-250 billion lei as the scheme's draw inJuly corresponds to 12-15 percent
of the monthly gross domestic product. If reinvestment rates remained the same, in the next
cycle, the scheme would have had to attract eight times this amount of money, or a flow of
between 96 percent and 120 percent of Romania's gross domestic product.

The Demise. Many observers recognized that the scheme could not survive much longer
given its size in the summer of 1993, 6 but predictions of its failure had been common since the
beginning. In early October, Caritas suspended payments, claiming that computer problems
were to blame. Although the press confidently proclaimed the scheme's collapse, after a few
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Shafir (1993) estimated that the scheme was drawing 3 billion lei per day during July
and 4.5 billion lei per day by August. He does not indicate the bases for these estimates.
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See, for example, Mueser and Franz (1993a, 1993b).
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days payments resumed. The episode may have reinvigorated the game, for a new serge of
investments followed resumption of payments.
Payments to investors continued through November 5, 1993, when they were again
suspended. Some payments appear to have been made toinvestors after that point, but the last
investors to have received full returns equal to eight times their investment were those investing
on July 4, 1993.
In the fall and winter of 1993, Stoica attemptedto establish branches of the scheme
outside the Cluj region, apparently hopeful of attracting still greater levels of investment. He set
up a branch of the scheme in Petrosani, the mining capital of Transylvania, with the support of
the miners' leader. Although it attracted substantial local investment, this was insufficient to
maintain the scheme. When local authorities denied his request to establish a branch in
Bucharest, he threatened a hunger strike. He did set up a branch in a suburb of Bucharest, but it
drew only a small number of investors. Rumors also spread that Stoica had traveled outside of
Romania to establish branches of scheme, but nothing appears to have come of such efforts.
The feared social upheaval following collapse did not occur. In part, this may have been
partly due to Stoica's efforts over the next several months to resurrect the scheme. Given that
payments continued for some three months after July, it seems very possible that as many as four
million Romanians invested as much as 1 trillion lei ($1 billion) inCaritas over its lifetime. 7
In the wake of the Caritas failure, a variety of similar schemes, with names like
Mondoprosper, Driada, and Novo Caritas, proliferated, but none lasted very long. Many
collapsed before making a first payment, their organizers recognizing the first cycle of
investments as the only return.
In 1995, the Romanian government brought criminal charges against Stoica for his
activities as head of Caritas. On conviction, Stoica was sentenced to two years in prison,
although he was released after 10 months. He faces a civil suit brought by 600,000 investors
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Our estimate of the total investment is therefore close to that given by in a recent
Reuters report (Eremia, 1996), but is smaller than the $5 billion total that some sources suggested
(e.g., Pedez, 1993).
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seeking compensation for losses in the case. Currently, legal restrictions appear to effectively
preclude the establishment of new schemes.

Growth of Pyramid Schemes in Albania
Albania's get-rich-quick schemes sprung up in 1991, less than a year after the last
communist president Ramiz Alia, facing widespread popular unrest, agreed to permit the
establishment of opposition political.parties .. Taking advantage of the.political turmoil and
power vacuum which characterized the first phase of transition from communism-to pluralism,
emerging businessmen set up several pyramid schemes, primarily in Tirane. Initially these
schemes made little headway because the economy had practically collapsed and the population
lived in extreme poverty, having become totally dependent for its survival on foreign
humanitarian assistance. But as Albania embarked on the road to recovery, following the
Democratic Party's sweeping election victory in March 1992, companies promising impossibly
high returns increasingly gained ground.
Between 1991 and 1996, there were at least nine companies that were suspected of
operating as pyramid schemes, the most important being Vefa Holding, Gjalica,.Xhaferri,
Populli, Kamberi, and Sudja. Thousands of unwary investors put their savings into these
companies, which promised interest rates ofup to 50 percent amonth. Earlier depositors made
huge profits from the deposits of those who followed them. According to conservative estimates,
Albanians invested close to $1 billion in the funds, the equivalent of about 25 percent of the
country's annual gross domestic product.
While pyramid companies had been active since the early 1990s, it was during the
summer and fall 1996 that their operations expanded most dramatically. This coincided with a
busy and troubling period as Albania held controversial parliamentary elections, in May 1996,
which were severely criticized by international observers and whose results were not accepted by
leading opposition parties. · Berisha' s government was preoccupied with the political fallout of
these elections and in campaigning for local elections, held in October 1996, and the government
was not willing to take the political risk of shutting down the schemes. The opposition, too,
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maintained a conspicuous silence. Meanwhile, in fall 1996 the pyramid schemes engaged in an
interest rate war, some of them, such as Sudja, hiking their monthly interest rates to 80 percent.
In November 1996, an IMF delegation urged Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi to
impose strict controls on the pyramid schemes and refused to sign a new agreement with
Albania. Despite this and other warnings, and other signs of a looming crisis, the government
failed to take action against the schemes·at that time. Although Parliament appointed a
transparency commission to investigate.the operation of the questionable investment companies,
by the time the government took action,· the schemes were beginning to crumble, and large
amounts of money had already been transferred abroad. In November 1996, Sudja company,
which had operated mainly in Tirane, stopped making payments, while Sander Grunasi, the
director of a small fund Grunasi, fled the country with $13 million. 8 In mid January, 1997, Sudj a
declared bankruptcy and its owner was arrested. 9 This was followed by the collapse ofXhaferri
and Populli foundations. The government seized $255 million held in state banks.by Xhaferri
and Populli. 10 On January 24 the authorities arrested the directors of the two funds, Rrapush
Xhaferri and Bashkim Driza, as well as some 50 operators throughout the country. 11 Rrapush
Xhaferri admitted that his company, which began operations in 1993, was a pyramid schemes. 12
In early February, Gjallica declared bankruptcy. Gjallica reportedly had attracted about $300
million in deposits; but its assets amounted to only a fraction of that amount (Done and Hope,
1997).
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Sander Grunasi left Albania on 6 November 1996, reportedly using an official passport.
See Zeri i Popullit, 23 January 1997, p. 9.
9

Albania, 24 January 1997, p. 3.
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Tirane TVSh Television Network in Albanian, 1900 GMT, 16 January 1997, in FBISEEU-97-012, 16 January 1997.
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ATA in English, 215 8 GMT, 24 January 1997, in FBIS-EEU-97-017, 24 January 1997.

12

See Rrapush Xhaferri's interview in Albania, 23 January 1997, p. 3. Bashkim Driza
had worked for Xhaferri but in July 1996 set up his own company, Populli. Ironically, Driza is
head of the People's Party, a left-wing party with close links to the Socialist Party.
9

The collapse of Gjallica caused immediate and widespread unrest in Vlore. · For days
security forces battled with angry protesters, finally abandoning the city altogether. Unrest
spread in other southern cities. Although many investors knew that the pyramid schemes had no
sound economic basis and that eventually they would crumble, they now blamed the government.
Opposition parties fueled the protest, in the hope of forcing the ruling Democratic Party to make
political concessions. What began as essentially an economic protest soon took on political
nature. Although the opposition had not criticized the schemes, it moved to capitalize on the
anger of the depositors, which turned against.the government. Forum for Democracy, a loose
coalition bringing together former communists and a group of former political prisoners,
demanded the resignation of the government and new elections.
The collapse of pyramid schemes wiped out the savings of more than half-a-million
Albanians and led to widespread violent unrest throughout the country. It also brought Albania
to the brink of civil war; resignation of Prime Minister Meksi, and the declaration of a state of
emergency.
In early February 1997, the authorities began repaying investors in Xhaferri and Populli
from the two firms' deposits that had been frozen in the state banks with payments amounting to
50 to 60 percent of their initial payments. They were given the choice of cash or savings
deposits. Some investors, however, refused the partial compensation, hoping to get full
compensation later. Those Albanians who had invested in Sudja and Grunjasi, which did not
have any assets, were unlikely to get any of their deposits.
Lacking resources and unwilling to undertake unfunded spending that might trigger
hyperinflation, 13 the government has refused to provide cash handouts from state coffers.
However, it has said it will try to find ways to compensate investors, and it has promised to help
the most severely affected people by offering them public jobs and providing credits to start
private businesses.

13

After several years of low inflation, inflation jumped to close to 20 percent in 1996.
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Comparison of Caritas and the Albanian case with Related Schemes

It is useful to briefly consider related schemes in other times and places. The scheme of
Charles Ponzi in Boston, Massachusetts in 1920 was notable for the public attention it
comm.anded. Ponzi offered 50 percent interest for 45 days in 1920, or the equivalent of
approximately 2,500 percent per year. Ponzi claimed that he was able to take advantage of
differing exchange rates across countries, buying and selling financial instruments in different
currencies .to obtain sure profits.. When newspapers. publicized the· opinions of financial experts ,
that such profits were impossible; Ponzi admitted that the exchange rate story was not true,·
claiming he had a method of investment that he wished to keep secret so Wall Street speculators
would not catch on. Over a period of seven months, Ponzi collected $9.6 million before the
operation was closed down (Russell, 1973).
Minsky (1982) has labeled such arrangements, in which returns for investors come from.
payment by new investors, as "Ponzi" financing. Schemes of this kind are hundreds of years old.
Kindleberger (1989) described several historical cases. One scheme established in 1872
promised Bavarian farmers interest of 20 percent per year; another nineteenth century scheme
offered to pay 40 percent per year. In both cases, the perpetrators drew extended prison
sentences.
Many stock.frauds are also based on similar financing structures. The.famous "South Sea
bubble" in 1720 provided spectacular returns for investors in the South Sea Company who
purchased stock that appreciated as speculation and fraudulent claims drove the stock price up .
.When it became clear that there was little return in the underlying assets of the company, the
stock price collapsed, inducing a financial crisis. Sir Isaac Newton was one of the investors who
purchased stock at the peak, and he lost £20,000 (Kindleberger, 1989, p. 38). In Russia, the
MMM stock offering attracted investors by promising dividends of 3,000 percent. While early
investors made fortunes, others lost everything when the company collapsed in early 1994.
Pyramid games and chain letters~operate-under the same basic financing ·structure. In
such arrangements, individuals pay for the right to recruit new individuals, who, in turn, recruit
others. A recent report described pyramid games played by residents of Palm. Desert, California
(Emshwiller, 1996). A typical pyramid had 15 positions, with one person at the top, two at the
11

second level, four at the next, and eight at the bottom. When all positions were occupied, each
person at the bottom would pay $2000, with the $16,000 total going to the player at the top, who
would then leave the pyramid. The pyramid would then split in two, with each player moving up
a level, and eight new positions in each pyramid being filled by recruits paying again $2000. As
with all of these schemes, when the game exhausts the willing population--as it must, ultimately
--the players who have not yet received their payoffs get nothing. At the time of the report, more
than 1000 residents of Palm Desert had.participated in the games, including local elites such as .
the president of a community college and. senior officials ill'several local organizations.
A chain letter that operates on the same principle but with very different dollar values has
been active on the Internet for at least the past two years. In this case, participants obtain
instructions from a message posted on a news group. A participant mails $1 to each of five
names on a list, removes a name from the list and adds his own, and then sends the message, via
electronic mail, to at least 200 additional news groups. The message carries testimonials
claiming returns of $20,000 to $50,000.
A final kind of pyramid scheme is observed in what are called multi-level marketing
arrangements. Although the goal of such structures is to sell a product, in such arrangements a
sales representative's returns derive primarily not from selling a product but from enlisting new
sales representatives. The Amway companyin the U.S. uses a multi-level market structure to
sell household products. One potential participant calculated, that if sales commissions were to
grow at the rate he had been promised, Amway sales would exceed the entire U.S. economy in
five years (Kling, 1996). Where they are successful, multi-level marketing can provide
substantial returns to early participants, but their gains are at the expense of later recruits who
join after the market for both the product and new recruits are exhausted.
Some authors have drawn a distinction between schemes that fraudulently claim to have
found some genuine investment opportunity allowing payment of extraordinary returns from
more transparent pyramid schemes and chain letters.· At least one writer has reserved the term
Ponzi for schemes involving such fraudulent claims (Nehra, 1996). In the case of Caritas, loan
Stoica did not have a detailed story to explain the high returns. When pressed by journalists, he
did refer to a secret method of making money, even talking of training followers to take over at
12

his death, but these claims amounted to little more than general assurances. In its formal
registration, Caritas described itself as a "mutual collective helping game," tantamount to a
statement that the scheme was based on pyramid financing. In terms of claims made to investors,
Caritas appears to have had more in common with transparent pyramids and chain letters than
with fraudulent investment companies.
Explicit fraud appears to have played a larger role in the Albanian schemes. Some of the
investments were offered by firms that strongly deniedbeing pyramid schemes, maintaining that
they obtained returns from corporate holdings. Founded in 1991 by Vehbi Alimm;aj, aformer
soldier, Vefa Holding became the country's largest company. It acquired numerous holdings all
over the country, including supermarkets, food processing plants, tourist centers, a ferry line, and
a mine. Gjallica, operating mainly in the south and in the northeastern city ofKukes, was
involved in tourist development, hotels, and gas stations. Other companies such as Kamberi,
Cenaj, and Silva also claimed to have legitimate businesses. Xhaferri and Populli, on the other
hand, portrayed themselves as charitable organizations, suggesting a similarity with Caritas.

Public Opinion: How People Understood the Schemes
Given that simple deception does not fully explain these schemes, it is natural to consider
the structure of expectations that undergirded their growth. How did investors view the schemesand what was their understanding of the processes producing returns? Were there special
circumstances that permitted mutually inconsistent expectations to form? And, if so, can we
predict when such circumstances will occur?
From its inception, opinions about Caritas were divided. A substantial portion of the
press attacked the scheme, predicting first its imminent demise, and then, as it continued to
prosper, economic and social disaster following its ultimate failure. While Caritas critics
included many of the educated elites in Romania, such elites were not absent among its
supporters. Cluj mayor Funar lauded-the scheme. During the-last months of the scheme, he •
appeared with Stoica on national television expressing his full confidence in Caritas, triggering
the last large inflow of investments. Grigore Zane, prefect of Cluj county, expressed only
slightly more tempered enthusiasm for the scheme when he commented, "I think it is worth
13

taking advantage of this phenomenon and using it, and supporting it, as much as we can, without
forgetting at any moment that each ofus may be a loser" (Toader, 1993). Zane noted that Caritas
brought substantial benefits to the Cluj area. As many as 2000 employees worked directly for
the scheme at its height. Funar claimed that voluntary donations by Caritas winners to the Cluj
city coffers were substantial. 14
Investors we talked to had a variety of explanations of how the scheme provided such
extraordinary returns. Many investors suggested that Caritas. operated as part of an illegal money
laundering scheme. 15 This is similar to a view that is common among individuals who invest in
fraudulent investment companies. Investors often believe there is some hidden illegal activity
which explains both the high returns and the fact that it is secret. However, explanations of this
kind did not provide the basis on which most investors acted. For the most part, those who had
confidence that the scheme could continue indefinitely had no consistent explanation for how the
returns were produced, merely basing their confidence on past performance. One person told us
that since it had lasted longer than previous schemes it would last indefinitely. Taken at face
value, such views suggest that these investment choices were made without any understanding of
or concern for the underlying processes producing returns. A second class of participants,
generally those who were more educated, recognized that the scheme would eventually fail.
They invested on the chance that it would not.fail. before theiueturn became available, hoping
that others would be losers.
Among those investing, a substantial·share hailed Stoica as a-national hero. Not only did
crowds of investors cheer him, but the supportive press carried glowing accounts of his acumen
as a businessman, economist and psychologist, declaring Caritas the salvation of Romania. One
writer suggested that Caritas revealed "the miracle of money laundering," with no irony intended
(Goga, 1993, p. 3). On what turned out to be the last day in which investors received full
14
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Verdery (1996) gives detailed accounts of a variety of explanations given by
participants for how the scheme worked. The extraordinary range of explanations supports our
own interpretation that they served as little more than window dressing, not as serious bases
driving the investments.
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payments, Cluj sociology professor Achim Mihu wrote, "the ultimate strength on which Caritas
rests lies with the human soul and its dreams; one cannot judge that negatively and simply
abandon it" (Mihu, 1993a). Those newspapers that continued to display hostility toward the
scheme suffered in the face of a supportive populace who appeared to view the attacks as an
attempt to abrogate their newly gained economic freedom. Even after payments ceased, a
substantial portion of investors remained loyal to the organizers. 16 As late as February 1994,
Cluj mayor Funar is reported to have said that he was confident that the game would be durable
over the long run (Todosiciuc, 1994).
Given that several major schemes operated in Albania, one might anticipate great
heterogeneity in the attitudes toward them. In fact, government leaders, the press, and popular
opinion were, without serious exception, strongly supportive of the schemes. There were no
meaningful warnings from either government or the independent media. Party and non-party
newspapers as well as the state controlled radio and television provided widespread, positive
coverage to the pyramid schemes, ran their advertisements, and prominently featured scheme
directors. Moreover, senior government officials continued to give tacit endorsement to the
investment funds even as collapse became imminent.
In an interview in November 1996 with the pro-government paper Albania, Blerim <;ela,
chairman·ofthe State Control Commission,said he did not believe that these firms faced
bankruptcy. Indeed, he insisted that there was nothing illegal about these companies, adding "I
think that these firms are involved in a good business, because they·help people ... " (<;ela,
1997). Arben Kallamata, a Foreign Ministry official and a former Nieman scholar, denounced a
correspondent of an Albanian-American newspaper who had written about the looming crisis, as
"a hack journalist in the Bronx." He also dismissed growing alarm about the pyramid schemes
as mere propaganda (Kallamata, 1996). As late as November 1996, Prime Minister Aleksander
Meksi attended an anniversary celebration for Vefa Holding, the largest investment company.
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Mihu (1993b) reported that 62 percent of respondents surveyed agreed that "the media
act in an evil manner against Caritas," 66 percent agreed that "Mr. Stoica means only well for
everyone," and 68 percent agreed that "Caritas will survive in the end."
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It may well be that many Albanians, poorly educated and with little experience of the free

market, were simply taken in by the claims of investment opportunity. By late 1996, the
suspected investment companies had launched a well coordinated publicity campaign to
convince Albanians that they were not pyramid schemes. In an article in November 1996, a
spokesman for Vefa Holdings claimed the company had invested "several hundred million
dollars" in various projects, from "mines, supermarkets, tourism, processing industries,
production lines in light industry and the food industry, stock raising complexes, catering, sea
and land transportation, and other cultural and sports activities." The spokesman strongly denied
that Vefa was a pyramid business (Iliazi, 1996). Like investors in Caritas, many Albanian
investors justified the scheme's returns with reference to the possibility of money laundering,
perhaps with greater justification that in Romania. According to some sources, organized crime
groups may have pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into the unregulated schemes. It is
therefore plausible that the Italian mafia and other foreign crime rings, working closely with
domestic groups, may have used the pyramid schemes to launder profits from drug and arms
trafficking, and refugee smuggling. 17
The strong support of the schemes in both Romania and Albania is reminiscent of the
support by investors in Charles Ponzi. Even after his purported methods of obtaining high
returns had been revealed as deception, supportive crowds cheered Ponzi, confident that the
scheme would in time be resurrected (Russell, 1973).
How can we explain continued faith in schemes with no meaningful economic basis? It
should first be noted that participants who recognize that the scheme will ultimately fail and that
the losers will predominate may nonetheless rationally choose to invest if they believe they will
be paid before the scheme collapses. As a group, residents of Cluj obtained substantial net
benefits from Caritas, since they were over-represented among early investors. It is difficult to

•..
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See OMRI Daily Digest, No. 32, Part II, 14 February 1997. There have also been
allegations, fiercely denied by the ruling Democratic Party, that senior government officials,
including former Minister of Internal Affairs Agron Musaraj and Minister of Defense Safet
Zhulali, were involved in drug trafficking and.illegal arms, and sale of oil to Serbia in violation
of United Nations sanctions (The Independent, 14 February 1997).
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argue that such insider investments in the scheme were irrational. Similarly, early investors in
the Albanian schemes, perhaps including a disproportionate number of elites, benefited from
those schemes. On the other hand, there are inevitably a much larger number of others who
make investments that do not pay off, those that we may view as outsiders. The difficulty is in
understanding their behavior within the rational structure.
In discussing speculative bubbles, Kindleberger (1989) claims that an initial period in
which investors obtain very large returns induces patterns. of behavior that .violate rationality.
As firms or households see others making profits from speculative purchases and
resales, they tend to follow ... When the number of firms and households indulging
in these practices grows large, bringing in segments of the population that are
normally aloof from such ventures, speculation for profit leads away from normal,
rational behavior . . . A larger and larger group of people seeks to become rich
without a real understanding of the processes involved."
Kindleberger captures the emotional response that draws initially reluctant players into such a
scheme with the observation, "There is nothing so disturbing to one's well-being and judgment as
to see a friend get rich" (p. 19-20).
While the experiences in both Romania and Albania support Kindleberger's
characterization, it is very difficult to reject an alternative explanation which does not rely on an
assumption of irrationality. Friedman (1969) has argued that destabilizing speculation may
reflect a positive demand for risk. The same logic may apply to investment in a pyramid scheme,
even when its structure is transparent. In this view, investors were merely participating in a
gamble in which the expected negative return was compensated for by the possibility of large
rewards. This interpretation argues that gamblers need not be irrational to bet, even in the face of
negative expected monetary benefits.
The possibility that the schemes filled an entertainment role appears more plausible in the
case of Romania than Albania. Relatively few investors in Caritas appear to have suffered
debilitating financial losses
in the.. game.
Even
in the game's
final stages,
the average investment
..
.-.
'.
-~
.
.
..
"-..
"

.,,.\

"•

'

'

~

was only a little over 120,000 lei, or less than two months salary for an average Romanian.
There appears to have been relatively little long term impact on most of the winners. Although
we heard talk of winners quitting their jobs, our impression is that this was not widespread.
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Caritas clearly served as a focal point for social interaction, with participants sharing of
information in what many may have interpreted as a "mock capitalism." 18
In contrast, the impact of the schemes on Albanians appears to have been much greater.
Many impoverished Albanians sold everything they had, including homes, farms, livestock, .and
belongings, in the expectation of doubling their cash in a matter of weeks. By fall 1996, an
estimated 700,000 Albanians out of3.2 million had become dependent on interest from deposits
in pyramid schemes for their livelihood and to supplementtheir meager wages. 19 The total ..
amount of money invested by Albanians; relative to the'size ofthenational economy,was ·.
certainly several times that for Caritas or other schemes in Romania.

The Role of Government

As noted above, Cluj government officials aided Caritas in a variety of ways, facilitating
use of government-owned office space and providing public statements supportive of the
scheme. The central Romanian government undertook little direct action during the lifetime of
the scheme, although it did license and tax it. According to Stoica, Caritas paid over 20 billion
lei ($20 million) in various taxes while it was in operation. We heard government officials say
that the scheme violated no laws, so that there was no basis for acting against it. When pressed,
officials frequently noted that the scheme involved just the kinds of voluntary trade on which the
free economy is based. As opposition newspapers pointed out, the scheme's popular support, in
conjunction with that oflocal government, would have made any action by the central
government against the scheme politically costly.
As in Romania, the Albanian central government claimed that it had no role to play in
regulating the investment schemes, insisting that it was a matter of citizens lending and
borrowing among themselves. Not only did the government fail to warn citizens of the dangers
18

Among.the large number ofCaritas..participants,some clearly did.suffer economic
hardship. Verdery (1996) reports that during the fall of 1993, Cluj banks repossessed more than
50 apartments that had been mortgaged so owners could invest in Caritas.
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As a foreign journalist putit, " ... it is difficult to find anyone in Albania who did not
entrust his meager savings to one of the pyramid schemes" (Hockstader, 1997).
18

of investing in unregulated pyramid companies, but it provided the stamp of approval by
maintaining close links with some of the companies, particularly Vefa and Gjalica. Moreover,
there were reports that some of the companies had contributed to the Democratic Party's 1996
election campaign. In the eyes of most Albanians there was no doubt whatsoever of government
endorsement of the pyramid investment schemes. Opposition political parties did not publicly
condemn the existence of the pyramid schemes nor did they call for government intervention.
The government stance in Romania and Albania while.the schemes were in operation
contrasts markedly with that in the U.S. and other developed countries. Specific laws and
general regulatory practice in almost all developed economies effectively prohibit schemes based
on pyramid financing. Commentators appear to take for granted that if there is no long run
method of actually obtaining the return promised to investors, that is, if the success of a scheme
depends on bringing in ever more investors, the scheme is fraudulent. Charles Ponzi's scheme
collapsed when Massachusetts state officials, under pressure from local financial leaders
c_onvinced that there was no underlying investment, prevented him from accepting further funds.
Both federal and state securities laws prohibit the kind of misrepresentation in which Ponzi
engaged.
In the U.S., not only are deceptive practices prohibited but so also are transparent
pyramid schemes. The pyramid games in.PalmDesert,.described above,.collapsed when
participants were indicted for violating a state law prohibiting .such schemes. Legal authorities
are active in prosecuting the organizers of the substantial number of pyramid schemes that have
been established recently on the Internet. In 1996, the Federal Trade Commission obtained a
federal court order halting a pyramid scheme advertised by Fortuna Alliance on the Internet.
Minnesota used state consumer protection laws to prosecute a pyramid scheme advertised to
America Online customers by an organization identified as International Network.
While chain letters promising large returns are common in the U.S., especially now on
the Internet, they are prohibited by beth federal and state law. In 1994,- the New Jersey-Bureau of
Securities filed a cease-and-desist action against participants in the same chain letter that is
currently operating on Internet news groups (Consumers' Research, 1994). In addition, since
chain letters involving money are classified as gambling, use of U.S. mails to send money, as
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required by such schemes, is illegal. Chain letters are also a violation of "appropriate use" policy
as set by the government agencies that administer the Internet backbone. Supported by these
legal prohibitions, individuals using the Internet frequently respond to chain letter postings on
news groups with marked hostility. Recent responses included statements indicating that legal
authorities or the U.S. Internal Revenue Service had been informed of the sender's notice, and
requests to the administrator of the sender's server that the account be canceled. One user
provided instructions on how to canceLa chain letter notice, essentially preventing the sender
from distributing it.
In contrast to other pyramid schemes, some multi-level marketing arrangements are legal
in the U.S. To be legal, returns must accrue from sale of a product, not from payments made by
new recruits for the right to recruit others. Although legal multi-level marketing may have some
elements of pyramid returns, the laws do restrict them in ways that limit their extent.

Explaining Pyramid Schemes in Romania and Albania

It is easy to dismiss most of the pyramid schemes springing up in Eastern Europe as the
products of shady organizers preying on a small number of gullible initial investors. In contrast,
the survival of Caritas in Romania and the nine large schemes in Albania are more difficult to
explain.' The single most important.factorthat distinguished Caritas from its short-lived,
competitors in Romania was the existence of strong initial support from government officials of
a major city. With nearly half a million population, Cluj is a regional capital, competing with a
small number of other Romanian cities with populations of less than a million for "second city"
status after Bucharest. Space in government-owned offices gave the scheme a semi-official
status. Support from Cluj mayor Funar, leader of a strongly nationalist Romanian political
party, may have given a patriotic flavor to participation in the game for those sympathetic to
nationalist politics. In the case of Albania, support for the schemes from the central government
was much more explicit than in Romania;-and this support:appears to have been echoed by
opposition politicians. In contrast to Romania, where elites were divided in their stance toward
the pyramid schemes, few Albanian elites appear to have publicly criticized the schemes.
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While the support of elites probably played an important role in both countries, there is
no evidence that state resources were ever used to subsidize the schemes or that the police
powers of the state abrogated property rights to foster the schemes' continuation. In neither
country did the government ever pledge explicitly to make good the schemes' obligations.
Rather, the local government in Romania and the national government in Albania were
important primarily because they served to bolster general confidence in the schemes, where this
confidence did not rest on any .single guarantee or statement of purported fact. For many
investors, it found form in the belief that new investors would continue to be drawn into the
scheme--at least for a while. We suspect that although access to the media placed government
officials in a position where they could aid the scheme in this way, since their actions did not rely
on the powers of the state, highly visible support by other opinion leaders would have worked
similarly.
A rather different analysis is necessary to explain why such a scheme succeeded in
Romania and Albania and not in other countries. Observers frequently attribute the growth of
such games to the low standards of living in these countries and the particularly severe economic
hardship in the 1980s wrought by their repressive communist regimes. In terms of economic
theory, it is tempting to assume that the absence of a free market experience left citizens of these
countries with little basis to form rational expectations .. If this were correct, such a scheme could
not exist in developed economies.
Comparison with the U.S., where pyramid·schemes are quite common, forces us to reject
these explanations. Consistent with the observation in Romania and Albania, such schemes in
the U.S. tend to survive longest when elites support them, for example, in the pyramid games
observed in Palm Desert, California. However, chain letters, both those using the U.S. mail and
computer links, exist as well, along with schemes advertised by various companies. Of course,
none of the American schemes has had any major social or economic impact, and one reason is
clearly the presence of legal sanctions.•-Continued active prosecution,under innumerable local
and federal laws means that no scheme in the U.S. can draw sufficient public attention--a
necessity for a pyramid scheme--to grow as large as those in Romania and Albania.
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The question then becomes one of political process. In the U.S., as in other free market
economies, there is a substantial class of owners of capital who wish to channel investments into
stable projects and to protect general confidence in existing investment structures. They have an
interest in passing and enforcing laws that prohibit pyramid or Ponzi financing. It is interesting
that the formal legal structures are fairly complex, and that direct pressure by financial leaders on
state authorities to limit such schemes appears to often play a role. Pressure on local authorities
by financial elites brought down Charles Ponzi. We suspect that the influence of the financial.
community plays a role in maintaining enforcement activities against current schemes.
Of course, neither Romania or Albania has a class of wealthy bankers and financiers, and
so there was no group with a natural interest in closing down these schemes. If elites were
overrepresented among the early investors, they might well benefit by the schemes even if most
people ultimately lost money. 20

Pyramid Schemes, Speculative Bubbles, and Economic Theory
The analysis above suggests that, under some circumstances, large numbers of economic
actors may behave in ways that violate assumptions of mutually consistent expectations. The
qualitative description of investors' behaviors and beliefs corresponds closely with the dynamic
which Kindleberger attributes to speculative manias .. Yet, in the cases he considers, the existence
of a base asset with a;potential to yield returns makes it difficult to determine whether investors
are irrational or merely mistaken. The fact that such a process can operate when the financing
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Verdery (1996) argues that Caritas and other pyramid schemes in Romania were
created by coalitions "consisting of officials of the Communist Party, one or another fraction of
the old/new Secret Police, members of the local police and judiciary, newly elected political
officials, and the henchmen of all these--people like Stoica" (p. 197). The involvement of
government officials in Albania is, of course,, ev~n clearer. •. Our view i_s that._the organizers and .
beneficiaries of such schemes were merely entrepreneurs, taking advantage of an opportunity.
Such individuals appear to exist in all economies, developed or not, and it is not surprising that
they would include elites who would be able to attract participants to the schemes. What makes
the Romanian and Albanian experiences different from that of developed economies is the
absence of stakeholders with an interest in limiting such activities.
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mechanism is an almost-transparent pyramid supports Kindleberger's claim that there need be
little rational basis for investors' actions.

It is important to stress that Kindle berger does not view such episodes of irrational
behavior as dominating economies. He suggests that when a variety of factors are coincident,
such behaviors can grow to dominate certain markets. However, in the aftermath of the collapse
of a bubble, fewer people are willing to make speculative investments, so such patterns cannot
reoccur immediately. Only after some period of time, when memories have faded, do speculative
bubbles again become possible.
Whereas Kindleberger's conclusions focus on actions by the monetary authority, the logic
of his model would appear to suggest an important role for the state in overseeing investment
arrangements. Actions to limit pyramid activities like those taken by governments in developed
economies may be entirely appropriate if market pressures fail to do so. Of course, such an
argument rests on at least a mild rejection of consumer sovereignty, since the justification for
limitations on pyramid schemes assumes that individuals are unable to determine what is in their
own best interests.

Conclusion: State Action in Pyramid Schemes and the Economy
The lesson for developing economies is that the structures necessary to provide for stable
investment in the economy are complex, and they may require government intervention in a
direct way. It does not appear that simple guarantees of well defined property rights, with the
right to engage in mutually beneficial exchanges, are sufficient to ensure the existence of stable
market behaviors. Of course, the argument for government involvement may be countered. It
may be argued that if the government were to maintain a consistent laissez faire policy,
institutional structures would develop to ensure the mutual consistency of expectations and the
stability of markets. However, even if this is true, it still does not appear that such structures
arise costlessly. Governmentinvolvement·is-ubiquitous in the-developed economies, so we do
not observe any environment where such free market structures assure market stability without
support from the powers of the state. A more radical argument would oppose government
intervention on the grounds that pyramid schemes are merely a form of gambling, which
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participants value, and is therefore welfare enhancing. Of course, no developed economy allows
unrestricted production and consumption of such "services"; even conventional gambling is
severely restricted.
The growth of games like those observed in Romania and Albania should be of concern
·to the newly free economies. They demonstrate the potentially irrational structure of investor
behaviors and they draw resources from productive activities that are necessary for development.
Kindleberger's analysis suggests that the .dynamic is similar in fraudulent schemes based on .
Ponzi financing.
One danger is that these schemes and related fraudulent investments will dampen the
willingness of participants in the newly free economies to invest in productive activities. In his
discussion of the South Sea bubble, Carswell (1960) argued that its effects on England were so
profound that economic innovation ceased for nearly 50 years, government restraints and private
fear of uncertainty overwhelming interest in any investment that might be viewed as speculative.
In that period, he described England as "cautious, cynical, and artificial, clinging to all that was
vested and established: a world we can study in slow motion" (p. 270). We hope that the
governments of Romania, Albania, and the other transition economies do not follow a policy of
retrenchment in the wake of Caritas and other speculative collapses that will restrain the
inventiveness that is necessary for long term economic growth ..

Conclusion: Security Implications in the Aftermath· of the Collapse of the Pyramids
With regard to Romania and Albania alike, the pyramid schemes and speculative bubbles
analyzed here damaged and, in many cases, destroyed the economic security of literally millions
of individual investors. At best these schemes supplanted economic productivity; thereby
weakening the long-term economic security of the state by tarring the public perception of the
market economy. This undermined popular confidence in the ability of existing governments
and politiciansto guide needed economfo.restructuring.· To the extent that government officials
and opposition leaders supported and were associated with these economic earthquakes, their
legitimacy declined and the process of building a stable multiparty system (political
institutionalization) itself suffered.
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The political consequences for Romania appear to have been much less severe than those
in Albania. In Romania, the political and social turmoil that had been predicted following the
collapse of Caritas failed to materialize, and none of the schemes that followed it attracted
similar levels of investment. While many Romanians believed that government complicity
played an important role in the rise of Caritas and that government officials benefited from the
scheme in various ways, the losses experienced by most investors appear to have done little more
than contribute to the already-high level of distrust in the government. On the other,hand, the
number and extent of fraudulent schemes using Ponzi financing appear to have grown in .
Romania. A private company Sabina Product SRL collected $24 million from investors in
Bucharest in 1995, promising 20 percent interest per month, before its organizers fled (Reuter,
1995). Two medium sized private banks, Dacia Felix and Credit Bank, both located in Cluj, are
currently in the midst of financial crises following revelations of major losses due to poor
lending practices, and, in the case of Credit Bank, fraud (Eremia, 1996).
Romanian free market reforms have been halting and slow, but it is difficult to determine
whether Caritas or the various fraudulent investment schemes which followed it played a role.
Certainly, these added legitimacy to the widespread perception that uncontrolled financial
markets would not necessarily operate to the benefit of the populace and in that way contributed
to the support for continued direct government control in the market.. However, since popular
and elite support for the free market reforms have been unsubstantial since the 1989 revolution,
there is little evidence that the trajectory of reform shifted significantly after the decline of the
schemes, and there is no indication that the stability of the Romanian state was adversely
affected.
In contrast, in Albania the internal security system, already weakened by the Berisha
government's purge of the Albanian armed forces, crumbled. Thousands of Albanians fled to
Italy or Greece; those who remained faced the prospect of civil war. In the more traditional
sense of military security, the-economic collapse pushed Albania off the road from Communism
to Democracy into armed anarchy. By March 28 this led to a U.N. Security Council Resolution
calling for a multilateral force of some 2,500 troops, with another 2,500 in reserve, to "protect
humanitarian relief assistance." This move came on the heels of an Italian threat to act
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unilaterally if something was not done to stem the refugee flood of more than 13,000 Albanians
that had already arrived in Italy. The U.N. and the Organization for European Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OESCE) moved to restore order and to stop the human hemorrhaging by
establishing conditions for internationally monitored June elections. The justification of this
U.N. resolution hinged on issues of regional security defined in fears that the unrest could "spill
over into ethnic Albanian minorities in neighboring states, encouraging them to seek a 'greater
Albania' " (Lewis, 1997).
The appeal of a 'greater Albania' is exaggerated. Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia
are not naive. They know that linking up with an Albanian government that by May 1997 is still
not in total control of the country with U .N. troops mandated to leave in June would not improve
their living conditions or political situation. Whether the Berisha government or an opposition
coalition led by Albanian socialists is in control, Albania has no help or resources to give in the
foreseeable future.
Yet essential abandonment of Kosovo in December 1991 by the EC and the international
community combines with the current crisis to form a different kind of dangerous mix. At that
time, the Kosovo appeal for recognition was rejected while those of Slovenia and Croatia were
accepted. Subsequently the 1995 Dayton Accords, implementing plans in Eastern Slavonia in
Croatia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina,.were,putin.place .. In an attempt to prevent the
spread of unrest into Kosovo, the leader of the nonviolent resistance movement in Kosovo,
Imbrahim Rugova has been pressured into postponing until December 1997 the election that he
had called for September. The U.S. and other foreign diplomats have told Kosovo Albanians to
forget about independence and to take part in the democratization of Serbian politics instead
(RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1, part II, 7 May 1997).
On the spectrum of Kosovo political options, this message can only weaken Rugova's
Democratic League of Kosovo in favor of more militant alternatives. In an interview with New
York Times correspondent Chris Hedges in Geneva,,the anonymous leader of the Kosovo
Liberation Army insisted that "we are not a terrorist organization ... we have support of nearly
all Albanians ... we target the secret police, Albanians who collaborate with the regime, and
Serbian leaders" (Hedges, 1997). Reports that in recent months the frequency and
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professionalism of his organization's killings has increased (RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1, no. 28,
part II, May 12, 1997) do not encourage optimism for internal security within Kosovo, Serbia, or
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The choreography of such political violence, escalating state violence in response,
widening support for militants at home and economic support from abroad is an old dance of
death that only expands the killing fields. And if war comes to Kosovo, it remains to be seen
what would happened to the ultimatums of Presidents Bush and Clinton, to Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic, that the U.S. would intervene unilaterally if necessary to prevent such
bloodshed.
With regard to Macedonia, it appears that the Macedonian government has not been able
to learn from economic disaster next door. On May 9, 5,000 people demonstrated in Bitola,
demanding that the government foot the bill for money lost in the collapse of the local TAT
pyramid scheme. There are promises of partial reimbursement and legal proceedings against key
figures responsible for the scam (RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1, no. 28, part II, May 12, 1997).
Although the initial response by the ruling Socialist Party has not been to play the national card
by hardening policies toward the Albanian minority in Macedonia, the security implications of
promised early elections in November 1997 are unpredictable, especially in the context of
Macedonian student anti-Albanian demands during demonstrations this spring and opposition
parties' attempt to take advantage of the student movement.
The bottom line for post-communist politicians and societies struggling to make painful
transitions to democracy and the market beyond the once 'iron curtain' is that economic, political
and traditional military security concerns have become entangled-- as a Serbian village proverb
might put it--like a pig's intestines. Moreover, there is substantial tension between internal
security and the economic rules of the game as established by international financial power
brokers. While international money lenders were free with their advice about the dangers of getrich-quick schemes~ they do not-appear to have had particularly helpful suggestions for
alternatives that would allow politicians who played by their economic rules to help their
increasingly impoverished voters survive.
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Indeed, to whatever degree post-communist security is a matter of psychological
credibility, the damage from the economic collapse in Albania goes beyond the Berisha regime
to tar Western financial and political advisors that attempted to tum Albania into a showcase of
beneficial multinational influence. There are reports that the U.S. and Europe treated Albania
"like a colony ... The United States put advisers in the Presidency and Ministries of Finance and
Defense. Italy advised the Privatization Ministry, and Germany helped out in the Ministry of
Interior?' (Perlez, 1997). Attacking Berisha for ramming through an inadequate election law
(RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1, no. 30, part II, May 14, 1997) will not answer questions about the
shared responsibility of Western influence for fathering what appears to be an at least
temporarily abortive effort to give birth to a democratic Albania with a functioning market
economy.
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